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Introduction
The political relationship between Norway and Russia will influence the devel-
opment of Barents Sea oil and gas. The state plays a decisive role in both the 
Norwegian and Russian parts of the sea. It does so as a regulator, through taxa-
tion, and through the national oil and gas companies, Gazprom, Rosneft, and 
Statoil. Thus, if the two states have a good relationship characterized by mutual 
trust, they can coordinate, search for complementarities, and mitigate issues 
that arise. Furthermore, due to the rising cost of oil and gas production in the 
Arctic, many oil and gas fields there may deliver small returns on investments. 
Scale economies brought about by coordinated development, joint infrastruc-
ture, and information sharing can tip projects from being commercially unvi-
able to viable. But this depends on the ability and willingness of the two states 
to actively work together.
It is commonly noted that Norway and Russia have been at peace for over 
1,000 years (e.g. Støre, 2010). At the end of World War II, North Norway was 
liberated from Nazi occupation by Soviet forces. During the two first decades 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia had better relations with Norway 
than with many other West European countries (Jensen & Overland, 2011; 
Vaage & Overland, 2011). Norway has not had a highly anti-Russian foreign 
minister, such as Sweden’s Carl Bildt, neither has it had a case such as that of 
Aleksander Litvinenko in the UK or Akhmed Zakayev in Denmark. Norwe-
gian companies have invested heavily in Russia, not just in the petroleum sec-
tor but also in telecoms, the media, and breweries. Some companies have made 
large profits, in spite of years of continuous quarreling between Norway’s Tel-
enor and Russian co-shareholders over a hostile takeover of a Ukrainian mobile 
operator (Liuhto, 2007). Russian companies, Rosneft and Lukoil, have in turn 
been allowed onto the Norwegian continental shelf, and Russian tourists are 
some of the biggest spenders in Norway. Russian students and immigrants have 
flocked to Norway, thriving there (Bourmistrov, 2007, 2011).
Nonetheless, the bilateral political relationship between the two countries is 
variable and subject to risks. There are at least two main sources of concern in 
the relationship between the two countries: their complex direct interaction in 
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the Barents Sea, and the broader political relationship between Russia and the 
West, of which Norway is a part. An accidental entanglement in the Barents 
Sea could lock the two countries into a negative spiral of actions and counter-
actions, or a long-term cold front in Russian–Western relations over a matter 
such as Ukraine could cast long shadows over the bilateral relationship between 
the two countries.
The Barents Sea and its petroleum province are divided in two by the 
1,680-km Norwegian–Russian maritime boundary (Moe, Fjærtoft, & Over-
land, 2011; Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011, p. 61). The length of 
this boundary, greater than the distance between Berlin and Moscow, means 
that the two countries have extensive and complex relations. The boundary 
crosses some of the world’s richest fish stocks; Russia’s only year-round, ice-free 
port in the Arctic is the Barents city of Murmansk; the Svalbard Archipelago 
on the Norwegian side of the boundary is Norwegian territory, but subject 
to the 1920 Svalbard Treaty, which gives other signatory states including Rus-
sia the right to engage in economic, maritime, research, and other activity on 
the archipelago; and, finally, the Barents Sea is the gateway to the Northern 
Sea Route leading to the Pacific Ocean. There are thus many opportunities 
for entanglement between Norwegian and Russian actors, including the joint 
management of fish stocks, illegal fishing, coast guards arresting fishing vessels, 
oil spills, nuclear accidents, and so on.
In this chapter we provide a forward-looking overview of the complexities 
of the relationships between the two countries. However, we start in the next 
section by looking back at the situation before the 2010 maritime boundary 
agreement. The subsequent sections deal with the reception of the boundary 
agreement in Norway and Russia, the place of Barents oil and gas in the broader 
Norwegian and Russian contexts, the linkages between Norwegian–Russian 
bilateral relations and broader Russian–Western relations, and implications for 
the future.
Before the Barents Sea maritime boundary agreement
The territorial dispute between the USSR/Russia and Norway dated back to 
the 1960s when the continental shelf came into the political spotlight, both as 
a promising petroleum province and as an emerging object of international law. 
The first informal Soviet–Norwegian consultations on the delimitation of the 
Barents Sea took place in 1970. The official negotiations were launched in 1974 
and then held on a largely regular basis. Once the two countries established 
their 200-nm exclusive economic zones (EEZ) in 1976, the mandate of the 
negotiations was extented to cover fisheries as well.
The Norwegians adhered to the median line principle, while the Soviet 
side maintained the straight sector line established by the USSR government 
in 1926. The overlapping disputed area was about 175,000 square km (some 
50,000 square nm) large, equivalent to over half of the Norwegian mainland 
territory (Moe et al., 2011).
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The first 15 years of discussions resulted in virtually no progress. However, 
the very fact of equal bilateral negotiations between a nuclear global superpower 
and its small but NATO-member neighbor was of major symbolic importance 
during the Cold War. Moreover, as early as in 1976, the two countries signed 
a long-term agreement on cooperation in fisheries and established the Joint 
Norwegian–Russian Fisheries Commission, which among other things sets 
agreed catch quotas for common fish stocks in the Barents Sea (Krivorotov, 
2011). Besides, in 1978, the USSR and Norway set up a temporary mechanism 
for regulating fisheries in the disputed area (the so-called Gray Zone agreement), 
which was later prolonged each year until the 2010 Murmansk Treaty was signed.
Both countries also had reasons to believe that the seabed in the area pos-
sessed large potential oil and gas resources, since Norway made numerous 
offshore discoveries in the North Sea and USSR in the eastern Barents Sea 
(Moe, 2010). In the early 1980s, a Soviet research vessel shot 2D seismic in the 
disputed area, which helped to identify several promising prospects, notably 
including the Fedynsky High. However, soon after, the two countries agreed to 
refrain from any further exploration in this area, and its actual reserves remain 
unknown.
In late 1988, the Soviet Foreign Ministry indicated for the first time that 
the Soviet Union might be willing to deviate from the sector line. After that, 
the delimitation process started making gradual progress, moving from north 
to south. When Mikhail Gorbachev visited Oslo as President of the USSR in 
June 1991, he announced that the borderline issue had already been resolved by 
two-thirds (Krivorotov, 2001). But in subsequent years, the talks slowed down 
and nearly stalled, as the negotiations moved on to the southern Barents Sea, 
which is the most important area for fishermen, oilmen, and navies alike.
The year 2010 finally brought about a real breakthrough in negotiations. At 
the end of the first visit of the Russian President, Dmitry Medvedev, to Oslo in 
April 2010, the foreign ministers of the two countries announced that a solution 
to the Barents Sea dispute had been reached and only details remained before 
an agreement could be signed (Bakken & Aanensen, 2010). A few months later, 
on September 15, the delimitation treaty was signed in Murmansk, dividing the 
disputed area approximately into two halves of 87,500 square km each.
The settlement, which was a surprise even to many insiders, apparently came 
about for several reasons. First, there had been a manifold increase in the level 
of bilateral relations, mutual interest, and trust over the two past decades. Russia 
and Norway had entered a number of agreements in various fields, exchanged 
numerous visits at top and high political levels, promoted mutual trade and 
investments, and cooperated closely in the High North, both in a bilateral 
format and within broader international organizations, including the Barents 
region and the Arctic Council. Second, it was in both countries’ interest to 
settle the territorial dispute in light of the work they were doing to stake their 
claims for the continental shelf beyond the 200 nautical mile limit. An extra 
concern for Norway was expanding the part of its seabed available for oil and 
gas exploration, as its oil production had peaked in 2004 and started to decline.
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Last but not least, Dmitry Medvedev, the pro-Western Russian President of 
that time, made a personal contribution to move ahead with the settlement. He 
made this clear in his joint news conference with the Norwegian Prime Min-
ister, Jens Stoltenberg, after signing the treaty (President of the Russian Federa-
tion, 2010). This agreement was of high political value that extended far beyond 
the scope of the bilateral relationship. By ending a decades-old dispute at a time 
when many observers thought of the Arctic as the object of an intensifying 
geopolitical competition, two of the major Arctic states sent a clear message to 
the world that any disputes in the Arctic could and should be resolved peace-
fully based on international law.
Situation after boundary agreement
The domestic reaction to the Murmansk Treaty was starkly different in the two 
countries. In Norway, it was hailed by a vast majority of stakeholders, notably 
including the parliamentary opposition and most independent experts, as a big 
step forward. With it, the country had settled the last and by far the biggest territo-
rial dispute it had with its neighbors. The North Norwegian fishermen were the 
only exception, as they were of the opinion that the deal could lead to a worsen-
ing of the situation for the fisheries in the area due to increased oil and gas activity 
and more lax fisheries protection (Fishermen fear the delimitation line, 2010).
The oil industry and northern regions praised the opportunity to develop 
oil and gas resources in the delimited area, reversing the negative trend in oil 
output, creating new jobs, and bringing income to the coastal communities. 
A large-scale campaign of petroleum exploration in the Arctic fits equally per-
fectly into the Norwegian government’s strategy and rhetoric on the High 
North (Jensen, 2012). As soon as the Murmansk Treaty came into force, it 
started sponsoring seismic shooting in the previously disputed area. However, 
licensing in the area followed the usual path, including the issuing of environ-
mental and social impact assessments, public hearings, etc. Exploration blocks 
in the southern part of the delimited area were granted for the first time in 
Norway’s twenty-second licensing round, in 2013.
By contrast, in Russia the treaty encountered significant skepticism. Fisher-
men, backed strongly by the Communist faction in the Duma, came out as the 
strongest opponents in Russia, as they stated that they were losing access to the 
rich fishing grounds in the western part of the formerly disputed area, which 
were now Norwegian waters. Although the joint fisheries management was 
to remain intact for 15 more years, they feared that their catch quotas would 
be cut dramatically (Norway to get part of Barents Sea today from Russia, 
2010). Another argument against the treaty, closely connected to the first one, 
was that it did not mention explicitly the special status of, and Russian rights 
on, Svalbard and in the adjacent waters, including notably Norway’s fisheries 
protection zone around Svalbard, which the USSR/Russia had never acknowl-
edged (Oreshenkov, 2010; Zilanov, 2013). The broader Russian public, which 
had been unaware of this dispute, also criticized the deal as a unilateral Russian 
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concession of its traditional possessions. If it had not been for the ruling party, 
Unified Russia, which was chaired by then Prime Minister  Vladimir Putin, the 
treaty would likely not have been ratified by the Duma.
Meanwhile, Rosneft, the Russian national oil company, which had for years 
shown an interest in the Barents Sea shelf, quickly saw the opportunities that 
the delimitation agreement created, all the more as the recent amendments to 
the Russian legislation on the continental shelf had made it possible for Ros-
neft to obtain Arctic shelf acreage without competitive bidding. By early 2012 
the Russian part of the delimited area was split into three large blocks, and 
Rosneft was granted the licenses to all of these.
The Barents Sea in the broader national contexts
The Arctic in general remains high on the political agenda in both Norway and 
Russia, with an emphasis on maintaining a presence and leading positions in 
the Arctic, developing domestic northern regions, and enhancing the national 
Arctic identity. This may encourage both cooperation and competition, as we 
have seen in the Arctic since the 1960s.
Despite the high political importance to both countries of oil and gas explo-
ration and development in the Barents Sea, any large-scale investments must 
be commercially viable and comply with broader national approaches to the 
countries’ petroleum resources. In other words, it is not just a question of Nor-
way and Russia coordinating their efforts in their respective parts of the Barents 
Sea, but also of how the Barents Sea fits into respectively the broader Norwe-
gian and Russian oil and gas industries.
In this perspective, the situation is asymmetric, as Russia has more domestic 
alternatives to the Barents Sea than Norway does, and the political context in 
the two countries is different. This asymmetric situation creates a trend towards 
an imbalanced development of the Barents Sea: the Norwegian petroleum 
industry is chased away from Lofoten and towards the Barents Sea, while the 
Russian petroleum industry is drawn away from Europe and the Barents Sea 
towards East Siberia and the Far East (although the Russian geopolitical interest 
in the Barents Sea may only be heightened).
The domestic Norwegian context
As in northwest Siberia, the producing oil and gas fields in the North Sea 
are in decline and Norway needs to invest if it wants to maintain the flow 
of petroleum revenue. In this regard, the two countries are in a similar situa-
tion. Although Norway is a much smaller country than Russia and has much 
less acreage for potential petroleum exploration and extraction, Norway does 
also have a choice between different petroleum provinces. Three of the main 
options between which the Norwegians need to prioritize are investing in 
enhanced oil recovery (EOR) to extend the lifespan of the North Sea fields, or 
in greenfield areas near the Lofoten Islands, or in the Barents Sea.
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The drivers and debate over priorities in Norway are, however, different from 
those in Russia. First, there is significantly more emphasis on EOR in Norway. 
The average rate of recovery in the North Sea is above 50%, whereas in Russia 
it is below 20% (Maugeri, 2006, p. 209). In 2014, the Norwegian government 
established a national center for EOR, further strengthening the emphasis on 
EOR (University of Stavanger, 2014).
Second, public concern over environmental issues plays a larger role in Nor-
way. This includes both worries over local environmental issues, such as oil spills 
and conflicts with fisheries, and Norway’s contribution to global greenhouse 
emissions. Sometimes these environmental agendas are debated separately; 
sometimes they are combined into a general environmental resistance by those 
lobbying against new oil developments.
One of the main ambitions of the environmentalists has been to avoid oil and 
gas extraction in the areas around the Lofoten Islands. Meanwhile, other local 
actors hope for economic benefits from increased petroleum activity in the 
North and actively promote it. The so-called red–green coalition government 
of the Center, Labor, and Socialist Left Parties that ruled Norway 2005–2013 
was divided on this issue and ended up closing the area for exploration for the 
time being. This ensures that the matter will reappear on the political agenda 
during the coming years.
The Lofoten Islands have been a logical target for environmentalists because 
they are important spawning grounds for cod, and because their natural beauty 
holds an important place in Norwegian ethnic identity. The Barents Sea is 
probably at least as environmentally important, and significantly larger, but has 
still received much less attention. Propetroleum interests have thus grumblingly 
accepted the moratorium on petroleum exploration in the area around the 
Lofoten archipelago, while accelerating exploration in the Barents Sea. Thus, 
paradoxically, environmental resistance may have led to more rapid develop-
ment of oil and gas in the Barents Sea.
While the Lofoten moratorium may have contributed to speeding up explo-
ration in the Barents Sea, it may also be an obstacle to the development of oil 
and gas fields found there. This is because it would be more logical to develop 
the Lofoten Islands first from an infrastructure perspective, as they are located 
north of the last area to have already been developed, in the Norwegian Sea off 
central Norway. Should natural gas be found, one could then consider extend-
ing the Norwegian offshore pipeline grid northwards to the Lofoten Islands, 
and then later on to the Barents Sea. With the environmental moratorium on 
the Lofoten Islands, they become an infrastructural missing link between the 
undeveloped Barents Sea and the developed southern parts of the Norwegian 
continental shelf.
For the professional environmentalist NGOs, climate change is as impor-
tant as, or more important than, local environmental protection. It is, however, 
more difficult to mobilize the population around climate change, especially 
the North Norwegian population, who can then feel that it needs to choose 
between the concrete benefits of jobs and rising property prices on the one 
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hand, and the abstract concern of climate change on the other hand (Kristof-
fersen, 2014; Kristoffersen & Jensen, 2012).
Another way in which the Norwegian government’s choices will play a role 
is in terms of its policy towards Russia. For Russia, Norway is a small neighbor; 
for Norway, Russia is its largest, and, importantly, most difficult to understand, 
neighbor.  As mentioned, Norwegian policy towards Russia has been milder 
and more cooperative than that of some other European countries such as 
Poland, Sweden, or the UK. There has been a relatively strong, albeit implicit, 
consensus about this across the Norwegian political spectrum. The main excep-
tion is the Venstre Party, which has spoken out for a more critical policy towards 
Russia (see Borsch, 2012), but this is a small party and all the major parties have 
de facto supported a foreign policy towards Russia of steadily growing ties and 
integration. However, this could change. During the 10-year period that started 
with Putin’s second presidential term in 2004, the attitude of Norwegian offi-
cialdom towards Russia has gradually deteriorated, especially since the events 
in Ukraine in 2014. Norway is also a founding member country of NATO and 
with strong ties to the UK and the US, potentially sources of influence for a 
more critical policy towards Russia. However, Norway is closer to Russia and 
so far the Norwegian elite have still been more cautious than those of many 
other Western countries in criticizing Russia.
The current coalition government of the Conservative and Progress Parties 
has continued the discourse on the Arctic but so far has not done much about 
it. Jonas Gahr Støre was quick to emphasize the High North when he was 
Foreign Minister under the coalition government that was led by the Labor 
Party. He has now been elected leader of the Labor Party and has launched cli-
mate policy (and possibly interethnic integration) as his main political cause(s). 
Although it is likely that the Labor Party will return to power in a 10-year 
perspective, there is thus little reason to expect that it will lead to a reinvigor-
ated focus on the High North and the development of new oil and gas fields.
The domestic Russian context
There are more alternatives to the Barents Sea in Russia than in Norway. On 
the one hand, developing the Arctic shelf enjoys a high priority in the govern-
ment’s plans, as a very visible way to compensate for the falling oil and gas 
production of the traditional Siberian fields, to establish a presence in the politi-
cally sensitive circumpolar area, and to enhance the well-being of the coun-
try’s northern territories.  All the relevant government papers, like the regularly 
updated National Energy Strategy or the Strategy for the Russian Arctic Zone 
adopted in 2013 (Government of the Russian Federation, 2009; President of 
the Russian Federation, 2013), set the goal of creating a new upstream province 
on the country’s Arctic continental shelf, which in the first order means the 
Barents Sea and eventually the Kara Sea. Russian researchers, although aware 
of the inherent environmental challenges, advocate strongly for intensified 
exploration and development of the nation’s Arctic shelf, as one of the biggest 
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remaining hydrocarbon reserves of global scale (Laverov, Dmitrievskiy, & Bogo-
yavlenskiy, 2011; Tsunevskiy, 2008). Gazprom and Rosneft also highlight their 
Arctic profile as a part of their global market positioning. When crude oil ship-
ments started from the Prirazlomnoye field in the eastern Barents Sea, Gazprom 
was happy to announce that it had opened a new Russian petroleum produc-
tion center in the Arctic.
On the other hand, the above plans date back to the time when experts in 
and outside Russia forecasted a steady growing demand for oil and gas in the 
Atlantic basin, both in Europe and the United States. There has been a need to 
reconcile policy goals with changing market realities. First, even regardless of 
the current strain in Russian–Western relations over Ukraine, both Rosneft and 
Gazprom have to revisit their market strategies. There has been speculation for 
some time as to whether Gazprom had to choose between the previously unde-
veloped Barents Sea and the more “conventional”   Yamal Peninsula (Moe, 2006, 
p. 393). Yamal has the advantage that, in terms of geology and natural condi-
tions, it is nearly identical to other onshore northwestern Siberia areas where 
Gazprom has proven technologies and decades of experience. This dispute was, 
however, rather academic as long as all experts foresaw a steady increase in the 
global demand for fuels, justifying simultaneous on- and offshore developments. 
But at a time when the United States is turning into a leading global producer 
and a potential net exporter of gas and perhaps even oil, when natural gas prices 
face an increased volatility and the EU attempts to reduce its dependence on 
Russian energy, the priorities may need to be set more clearly. “Gazprom criti-
cally analyzes and reviews the strategies it has been following recently,” its CEO, 
Alexey Miller, said in October 2014, addressing the global changes in the natu-
ral gas markets. “It doesn’t mean that we are going to change these strategies 
and approaches, but it is possible” (Gazprom, 2014b).
The Ukrainian crisis has added to this strain. By June 2014, Ukraine had 
accumulated debt for previously delivered Russian gas worth USD 5.3 billion 
and Gazprom switched to deliveries against advanced payment only. This may 
lead to Ukraine consuming some of the transit gas delivered from Russia to 
the EU through its territory, something that has happened before. Both parties 
have sued each other in the Stockholm Court of Arbitration. Several rounds 
of tripartite Russia–Ukraine–EU negotiations on gas sales to Ukraine failed to 
produce an agreed price. Rosneft has also declared the loss of some of its oil in 
the Ukrainian pipeline network and in addition had to postpone the planned 
overhaul of its Lisichansk refinery in eastern Ukraine due to the violence in 
that part of the country (Rosneft plans to seek compensation, 2014). As a result, 
the Russian oil and gas transit through Ukraine, which had never been easy, 
became even more unpredictable than ever before, forcing Russia to further 
intensify its efforts to diversify export routes.
The second point, which is interrelated with the first, is the growing Russian 
focus on the expanding Eastern Asia markets (China, Japan, Korea, India, etc.). 
Their demand is big and growing, while natural gas prices are some periods 
twice as high as in Europe and the US. Besides, energy cooperation with these 
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nations gives Russia a strong impetus to develop infrastructure in the adjacent 
regions of eastern Siberia and the Far East, which are vital to provide Russia 
with an access to the Asia–Pacific area. Problems in the European market are a 
secondary, still important, factor to enhance this trend.
In the past few years, Russian companies, backed strongly by the authori-
ties, have committed to supply major quantities of both oil and gas to China. 
In 2009, the Russian state oil company, Rosneft, signed a deal with the 
China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) to supply 15 mt/y of oil till 
2030, starting in 2012. In 2013, Rosneft signed an additional contract with 
CNPC for the supply of another 365 mt within 25 years, and also signed a 
memorandum of understanding with Sinopec to deliver another 100 mt of 
oil in 2014–2023 (Starinskaya, 2013). Besides their great scope and long-term 
nature, these contracts have the strong advantage for Rosneft of major advance 
payments (for example, USD 70 billion under the second Rosneft–CNPC deal 
alone) (Rosneft receives advance payment from China for oil, 2014). Rosneft 
has also recently engaged in a number of joint projects with Chinese companies 
on producing oil in eastern Russia and constructing an oil refinery in China 
(Rosneft, 2014).
In May 2014 Gazprom signed a contract worth USD 400 billion with CNPC 
for the delivery of 38 bcm/y of natural gas from eastern Siberia to China over 
25 years starting from 2019. On September 1, 2014 Gazprom started construc-
tion of the 4,000-km-long Sila Sibiri [Power of Siberia] gas pipeline (Gazprom, 
2014a). At the ceremony Gazprom also indicated that another contract may 
soon be signed with CNPC for the western route, to transport gas to China 
from existing fields in western Siberia, which make up the main resource base 
for deliveries to Europe (though Gazprom maintains that it has enough gas to 
supply both markets). The framework agreement on the western route was later 
signed by the two companies on November 9, 2014 under the Asia–Pacific 
Economic Cooperation Summit in Beijing (Gazprom, 2014c).
Third, as several industry experts and environmentalists have pointed 
out, there are promising alternatives to increasing upstream production, like 
enhancing oil recovery from the fields in operation, cutting associated gas flar-
ing, and curbing nonproductive fuel and energy losses under both production 
and consumption. According to Russian estimates, energy efficiency may be 
increased by 30% in national power generation and by 40% in hot-water supply 
systems.
The effect of these market-driven changes, which were already well underway 
before the conflict in Ukraine, on Russia’s interest in the Barents Sea may be 
exacerbated by the Norwegian government’s participation in Western criticism 
and measures against Russia, including economic sanctions. The attempts by 
the US and EU to isolate Russia highlight the risks involved in close economic 
relations with them for a government such as that of President Putin, which is 
not recognized by Western governments as democratic. As predicted and theo-
rized by Overland, Torjesen, and Kjærnet (2010, p. 93), the realization of this risk 
causes countries with such governments to reorient themselves towards China.
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Seen with Russian eyes, the issue is more fundamental: the West has failed 
to establish a working global order based on a unilateral dominance, and other 
nations have to combine their efforts (both in political and economic terms) 
to construct a more balanced system of relations and protect their legitimate 
interests. This close interaction of economic, political, and ideological consid-
erations makes the situation both complicated and hard to predict. However, it 
is rather evident that Russia lacks some key technologies to develop its Arctic 
shelf, and the US and EU sanctions on the transfer of Arctic and deep-sea oil 
and gas technologies can help make Russian companies focus more on Siberian 
onshore fields and Asian markets.
Another factor in the Russian domestic context is the potential changes 
in the country’s company landscape. Novatek and Rosneft actively increase 
their national gas production and sales, and Gazprom could potentially lose its 
monopoly on pipeline exports (see e.g. Henderson, 2013; Lunden, Fjærtoft, 
Overland, & Prachakova, 2013). Already Novatek has been permitted to launch 
LNG exports from its Yamal LNG project independently of Gazprom, and 
Rosneft indicates a strong desire to obtain gas export rights both for LNG and 
pipeline gas. These changes may further enhance the Russian trend towards the 
East, since both Novatek and Rosneft seem to be giving high priority to coop-
eration with China (CNPC already has a 20% stake in Yamal LNG).
As the scenario horizon of this book is 10 years, which exceeds the consti-
tutional term in office of President Vladimir Putin, it also raises the question 
of Russian policies in the longer run. The government could, for example, 
pursue a more liberal Western-oriented policy, or rely more on Asian partners, 
or become more domestically oriented. This applies to Russian behavior in 
the Arctic as well – different modes are possible, and the choice among these 
does not at all depend solely on the personality of the next Russian president. 
Indeed, the president possesses extensive powers, but the personal factor is often 
exaggerated (Overland, 2011), as the declared and especially the practical Rus-
sian policies are a product of a broader elite and government apparatus. The 
Arctic shelf is a good example of this. While the Russian laws ban foreign 
investors explicitly from the shelf resource base, this has not stopped Rosneft 
and Gazprom from forging offshore partnerships with foreign companies and 
from suggesting legislative amendments to facilitate this in September 2014 
(i.e. when the Western sanctions against Russia had already been imposed). 
In this respect, the political developments in Russia represent an uncertainty. 
Russian–Norwegian political relations in the Barents Sea will be a function of, 
among other things, the broader Russian choices between East and West, plus 
the general role of the Arctic in the national political agenda.
Concluding thoughts: the broader influence  
of Russian–Western relations
All the factors explored above are important to understand the prospects for 
Norwegian–Russian cooperation. An additional and overarching factor that 
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must be considered as we conclude is the broader relationship between Rus-
sia and the West. Relations between Russia and the West have entered a spi-
ral of Western sanctions and Russian countermeasures over the conflict in 
Ukraine. As this book has a 10-year scenario horizon, it is, however, impor-
tant not to become too caught up in current events – however difficult that 
is. The longer-term implication of the current impasse is a major break in 
Russian–Western relations. Even compared to previous negative incidents such 
as the conflict in South Ossetia, this is worse. Russia and the West appear to 
be locked into a negative spiral, where it is difficult for either party to offer 
a compromise. It will be difficult for any future Russian leader to give up or 
compromise on Crimea, and it will be as difficult for Western leaders to accept 
Crimea becoming part of the Russian Federation. Once in place, sanctions 
may be difficult to remove, because it puts the onus of argument on those who 
want to remove the sanctions. These considerations point towards a long-term 
worsening of Russian–Western relations.
However, it is also possible that Russia and the West will be forced to find a 
modus vivendi. Arguments pointing in this direction are a number of common 
challenges like fighting terrorism and reshaping the global economic order, 
Russia’s dependence on oil and gas revenues, economic collapse of Ukraine 
(about which both sides may ultimately be obliged to do something), the EU’s 
dependence on Russian energy, and Russia’s fear of becoming too dependent 
on China.
So what then does this imply for Norwegian–Russian relations? One analysis 
that was carried out before the Ukraine conflict found that Russian–Western 
political trade had a limited impact on Norwegian–Russian trade and economic 
cooperation (Vaage & Overland, 2011). This analysis covered eight previous 
political spats between Russia and the West. However, none of these quarrels 
were as severe as that over Ukraine, and none involved formalized sanctions by 
the West against Russia. In this respect it is clear that the Ukraine crisis is differ-
ent and will affect the bilateral trade relationship, although it is not possible to 
say how much and for how long.
What can be said with some confidence is that Norway, in spite of not 
being an EU member, is highly loyal to EU policy. Although Norway can 
choose whether or not to follow the EU’s lead on Russian policy, any Nor-
wegian government is likely to do so. This is because the main political parties 
in Norway – the Conservative and Labor Parties – are both firmly pro-EU, 
and because adhering to EU policy removes the risks involved in formulating 
an independent policy. As long as Norway consistently follows the EU lead, 
there is not so much need for the government to explain its choices, as they 
are made for it by the EU. As soon as Norway deviates from the EU line, the 
question arises whether it should be more or less lenient and why. Thus, as 
long as the EU is locked into a formal conflict with Russia through formal-
ized sanctions, Norway is likely to also be so. Since the oil sector was singled 
out for targeted sanctions early on, this does not bode well for cooperation in 
the Barents Sea.
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On the Russian side, the Russian–Western distrust over Ukraine is highly 
negative for Russian interest in the Barents Sea because the Russians are already 
so dependent on European gas markets. Events in Ukraine make Russia want 
to diversify export markets towards Asia faster, and the Barents Sea is just about 
as far away from Asia as one can get on the planet. At the same time, tensions 
with the West may strengthen Russian security and military attention regard-
ing the Barents Sea, which might add additional negativity to the prospects for 
Norwegian–Russian cooperation in the area.
In the past there have been suggestions for Norwegian–Russian joint infra-
structure for the transport of natural gas from the Barents Sea to markets, either 
in terms of extending the Norwegian offshore gas pipeline grid northwards to 
the Barents Sea (Barlindhaug, 2005), or in terms of building a pipeline from 
the Murmansk to Hammerfest so that Russia could use the Norwegian LNG 
capacity to export Shtokman gas when suitable and the Norwegians could 
pump their gas in the other direction and use the planned Murmansk–Vyborg 
pipeline to export gas to Europe when suitable (proposed by Karen Sund of 
Sund Energy, personal communication). One problem with these propositions 
is that they would increase Russia’s dependence on transit countries, which it is 
generally trying to reduce (as well as increasing Norway’s mutual dependency 
on Russia). However, in the context of a continuing standoff between the EU 
and Russia, such proposals might gain new currency if they helped dissipate 
mutual fears by mixing Russian with Norwegian gas.
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